Thursday, March 5, 2015

Amazing online site for Athens' post byzantine architecture (1453+ad)

I came across this site for Athens' architectural history from 1453 to modern times, which I find quite impressive. As it also provides the addresses for most buildings, it allows you to check them out on google street view.

http://www.eie.gr/archaeologia/En/arxeio.aspx

Sunday, March 1, 2015

Divine Financing rejected: The case of Venezuela, but strong similarities to Greece

After a worldwide trip to Russia, China, Iran and some Arab states seeking economic aid, Mr. Maduro simply announced to all: “God will provide.” The humorist Laureano Márquez (who belongs to the Venezuelan opposition) produced a widely read public letter purportedly from “God” in which He says: “I already provided you with fertile farmland, plains for the raising of cattle, forest tracts where you can grow cacao and coffee, major navigable rivers, beaches for tourism. … Underground I gave you the largest oil reserves in the planet and … gold, aluminum, bauxite, diamonds … 15 years of the greatest oil bonanza in the history of humanity … ”
Further, Mr. Márquez’s “God” cannot comprehend how the Chavistas have managed to ruin Venezuela’s economy. Such is the divine personage’s concern that He ends the letter with: “I’m sorry, my child. I have to tell you that your request for heavenly financing has also failed.” (www.forbes.com) (for the full original in spanish: http://linkis.com/www.envenezuela1.com/QrKT2)

And here came a response:

Dear and allegedly divine entity,
Your recent open letter to Nicolás Maduro took my virtual life by storm on the morning of January 23rd. It was published on numerous digital media, dozens of my friends and relatives posted it on their Facebook timelines, a bunch of people sent it to me via WhatsApp, and it all but flooded that precarious substitute of the Venezuelan free press we call Twitter.
Today, I sit down to write these lines to you—instead of finishing up an article on certain childhood remembrances of the Venezuelan hinterland I’ve been working on for a while—because your words truly resonated with some of my most tormented reflections about the sad fate of our country (by “ours” I don’t necessarily mean yours, naturally). I don’t have much to say in regards to the pertinence of the message your warm letter seeks to covey to Mr. Maduro (a.k.a. “a historical error,” Nicmer Evans dixit). It seems to me quite obvious that neither you nor any other real or imagined deity will provide anything that could rescue Maduro from his political labyrinth or deliver us, Venezuelans, from the dark days that await us. I concur with your words on this unreservedly. What I found distressing about your letter was the hyperbolic tone of the line of reasoning through which you attempt to show Maduro how much has already been divinely provided to Venezuela. I ask that you don’t take these words as agnostic. Indeed, faith rules over an imprecise but nevertheless important province of my soul. This, I admit to without shame. It is precisely because of the influence on my reason of such indeterminate faith—which compels me to consider the essential injustice of any suggestions that there could be among us a community of divinely chosen individuals—that I allow myself to openly disagree with the proposition that there are (or at some point in the past were) any deific hopes about Venezuela’s future, as you lament towards the end of your letter.
Your characterization of Venezuela as one of the most sublime works of divine creation makes me cringe. Not because you say it, however.  At the end of the day, I am not sure about whether or not you are just a literary fiction on Laureano’s part. What horrifies me about such senseless proposition is the fact—confirmed by the truly vigorous circulation of your letter—of how many of us consider it truthful. I am inclined to say that your words are almost as reckless as those by the late Hugo Chávez, a formidable prestidigitator whose trickeries always catered to his audience’s most irrational fears, convictions, and aspirations. In defense of your proposition, you offer Maduro a brief sketch of Venezuela’s geography: its rivers and beaches this, its snow-capped peaks and savannahs that. One has got to appreciate the irony that the substance of your purportedly heavenly argument should directly point to the soil—that is, to the million or so square kilometers of land under Venezuelan political sovereignty. In your letter, you make reference to the supposed fertility of virtually all of Venezuela’s territory, to the largest oil reserves on the planet, to gold, to aluminum, to bauxite, to diamonds, and to “so many other things.” It astonishes me that in order to call Maduro’s attention on the catastrophic consequences of the economic and political model he is accidentally destined to dismantle, you should resort to the very idiosyncratic shortcoming to which our lamentable situation is owed. I am referring to the preposterous belief—so deeply entrenched in our collective political conscience—that we have a right to sustained economic welfare as a result of the supposed (and supposedly providential) mineral richness of our soil.  In other words, that we have a right to something in exchange for nothing, simply because of an inexplicable act of generosity on your part. 
I don’t want to take issue with the geological basis of your argument, which in all honesty could not withstand the slightest degree of scrutiny. Passing consideration of the economic prosperity of The Netherlands—a significant portion of whose small and densely populated territory has been literally stolen from the North Sea—should make this crystal clear. I want to focus instead on the ethical essence of your proposition and reject it most emphatically. No, Sir (capitalized, just in case). Your alleged munificence gives us no right whatsoever to any degree of welfare. Do not suggest that, by your grace, we have become beneficiaries to a right to receive without giving. It is not fair that the powerful should continue to trick us into partaking in such ethical imposture—as the regime astutely does, as leaders of the opposition feel obligated to do, and as now you turn out to want to do as well. It is not fair because it prolongs the political embargo on what each and one of us truly has a right to—that is, to the individual and responsible management of our own lives, whether to let ourselves go with the inertia of things (“destiny,” as some call it) or to stubbornly resist it.  Turned into discourse, that falsehood has made it politically feasible for the militaristic, kleptocratic regime of Chávez and Maduro to hijack every institution of the Venezuelan state—to the colossal and almost exclusive economic profit of its nomenclature.   
Let us not fool ourselves, Sir. Something terrible has happened to us. And somehow, the explicit and tacit rules of our national coexistence have allowed it. We don’t owe you the explanation of how a prolonged oil bonanza has resulted in ruin rather than prosperity. We owe it to ourselves. Your efforts to stupefy us with clichés are not helpful. The richest soil, the most fertile lands, the most paradisiacal beaches, the most beautiful women, the happiest and most generous people, the extraordinary biodiversity, the miraculous convergence of every climate on earth, the example of Caracas and the glorious army that liberated all of America… all that nonsense. Surrendering to chauvinistic hallucinations will not help us get out of this mess. To care deeply for Venezuela, to be aggrieved by its fate, it is not necessary to believe that it leads in anything—and, least of all, that it does so by providential design. I care deeply for Venezuela and pain for its fate—perhaps more intensely than ever in the terrible certitude of our spectacular failure. 
Unlike Laureano, I am nobody—nobody famous, I mean. I am just a historian, academic researcher, and university instructor trying to pursue a modest life-plan that seemed unviable in my country of birth: Venezuela, that is, which I left fifteen interminable years ago. Up rootedness and the turn of events have forced me to face the absurdity of bombastic, nationalistic utterances—mine or anyone else’s. But that has hardly eroded my love for Venezuela: quite the opposite. It is wonderful to allow yourself to wholly embrace a cause without feeling urged to portray it as extraordinary. 
I have no way of delivering this letter to you or to Laureano. Perhaps a reader will be kind enough to help me on this. But that would surprise me—I confess—because I am afraid this letter will be read with much less sympathy and retransmitted with considerably less enthusiasm than yours.
Truly yours, anyhow.
Michel Otayek.

Friday, February 27, 2015

Greece: So what next?

It is a week now that the main issue of reopening the greek program appears to have been resolved. Nothing has been really been agreed, except for a likely slight relaxation of this year's primary surplus target and that no policies shall be enacted with a fiscal impact. The rest is to be agreed, and effectively discussions for program 3 are now open and have a deadline of June 30, 2015.

The entire effort of the two protagonists, Varoufakis and Tsipras, has been on this issue, and this is logical. However, now comes the need to pull together the government and make it function in line with what has been explicitly or implicitly or tacitly agreed. Because the one clear message is "DO NOT GO ON A SPENDING SPREE" during these 4 months. This is the testing period for the government, and showing that it controls things and can deliver is of primary importance. 

This is true on two fronts: the external, where many governments hope that Syriza will demonstrate total incompetence, hence they can then finish with Greece once and for all for fault. Other governments just hope that an obedient government will come to power, replacing Syriza. Nobody really wants a success for Syriza.

Then there is the internal front, where the real issue is. This is where success or failure shall be determined, because even if Greece is eventually forced to exit the euro or otherwise defaults without debt relief, the economy's performance shall determine the outcome for the country. Although there are some political and economic interests that oppose Syriza, that is not the main problem. The first is internal opposition within the party of Syriza. And the second is the total lack of managerial experience of yet another prime minister and minister of finance. The combination of these two seems catastrophic.

So what are we seeing on this front? The Syriza government is not functioning and its ministers seem to think that they can do whatever they want for 4 months. A clear policy for these four months needs to be established and followed strictly. There is only one thing to do: prepare and agree the new program. No resources should be wasted on other things. I will outline certain basic management concepts, including key confidence building actions, which I think would be useful particularly during this period:

1. Establish a clear management structure for the government's functioning with rules for and coordination of all actions and announcements regarding government policy. The present image is one of complete lack of coordination and management with a lot of confusion being generated on a daily basis. The issue of the prototype schools comes to mind.
2. Expectations' management: the government should refrain from doing or announcing things it cannot do or things that are contrary to its pre-election promises with respect to the majority of the electorate. Even minor such things can destabilize popular support and bring collapse. It is better to lose the support of 2-3 special interest groups such as e.g. the ERT personnel, than ridicule yourself as a government in front of the entire electorate by e.g. increasing the television tax - which used to be sufficient - to pay for them.
3. Putting together the details and the numbers of the new program, MOU #3 or, in politically correct words, the Agreement. No time or effort should be wasted on other things, four months is very little.
4. Put all effort in revealing and cutting wasteful expenditure. This should not be that difficult and has limited political cost, but requires a change of heart for most Syriza people.
5. Identify certain cases of real major tax fraud and corruption covered up by the previous governments with the purpose of maintaining a sense of fairness and political support while difficult real reforms are planned. This should be only too easy to do. Syriza should also demonstrate leadership and modernity by avoiding Mccarthyist tactics used in the past.
6. Restore basic faith in the tax/judicial system in line with pre-election promises. This will also help stop capital flight and restore small business confidence.
7. Stop the tax uncertainty, primarily for indirect taxes. This should also have a direct effect on consumption, which was affected in the last few months by the obvious impasse with the troika and the expectation of new taxes.
8. Take simple cheap measures for the humanitarian crisis. This is probably the only one being implemented but its costs and financing seem unclear.

Failure to achieve what needs to be achieved, without ideological fanaticism, is a must if the country is going to come out of the mess of the last decade.

Tuesday, February 24, 2015

Greece's letter to the Eurogroup: At last Greece takes ownership of its program!

This morning Greece's new government sent a letter to the Eurogroup describing the reforms it intends to implement. The text can be found on the internet, a sample reference is provided at the end. I will make only two key points:

A. Dramatic qualitative change: This is the first and only time that a Greek Government has taken ownership of a program. This is no longer something being dictated from foreigners which the greek government will do everything it can to circumvent implementation, as happened for 5 years now. Hopefully...

B. Content: This looks like unfortunate program #1 of the spring of 2010 which was only 1/4 implemented. That program had four axes: tax more/transfer* less, spend less, reform public sector, liberalize markets. It has differences, but the direction is the same. Yet program #1, due to being imposed and not owned by the Greek government, resulted in only one thing being done: increased taxes and cut transfers (where public sector wages should be viewed as mostly transfers...).


* Transfers in this case means all government revenues and payments which are related to non funded policy schemes with accumulated liabilities such as pensions, mandatory health insurance, and employment obligations. So transfer less means either increase social security contributions or decrease payments for health, pensions and non-market/non-productive salaries.


Sample reference: http://clamo.ftdata.co.uk/files/2015-02/24/GREEK%20GVT%20REFORM%20AGENDA.pdf

Monday, February 23, 2015

Germany's Pyrrhic Victories and Signs of Hubris: Ukraine and Greece

Germany is unquestionably the leading economy within the eurozone. Yet it seems that it has also decided to lead, whether by default or on purpose, the European Union and particularly the Eurozone. There is already a plethora of voices discussing the issue, as the link provided below and the recent critique of philosopher Habermas, so I will avoid repeating the arguments. The point I would like to argue is that Germany is doing a very bad job of leading Europe despite appearing to get its positions imposed, inflicting long term losses not only on others which they call friends and partners, but ultimately to itself. And I shall use the Ukraine peace effort and the Greek sovereign debt crisis -episode 3 - as examples.

Ukraine: If I were writing a novel, I would start with "Europe's boss, taking hand in hand her alibi Francois, went for a romantic walk along the shores of the river Donets". However this is not a novel, it is real war with real dead and high emotions on all sides. So what did Germany do wrong here? (A brief background is provided in a PS at the end).

  1. Merkel was self appointed as informal EU leader on the issue despite the specific provisions of the Lisbon Treaty providing for a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to represent the EU in foreign affairs, ignoring basic recent concepts of the Union's rulebook. Dragging along Francois Hollande, who needs to increase his visibility at home, as an alibi that this is two major players in Europe doing things, not the EU.
  2. Merkel displayed incredible hubris in doing so: The Ukraine has been a target of German foreign policy or practice: the holding of part of it by the Austrohungarian Empire, the immigration of the Ukraine by Germans in the 19th century, the subsequent treaty of Brest Litovsk of 1918 that handed it to Germany, and most recently the invasion of the Ukraine by Nazi Germany in 1941 which required a lot of Russian blood to be spilt in liberating the Ukraine. When Germany tries to mediate between the Ukraine and Russia for a cease fire which can only work against the Russian nationals in the Ukraine, it is an insult to Russia. It is the equivalent of Israel mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait, of Taiwan mediating between the PRChina and Japan, of the USSR mediating the reunification of PDRGermany by West Germany.
So Merkel went away, as a modern Chamberlain leaving Munich, thinking she had achieved peace and a diplomatic victory on Germany's vision of the Ukraine. And quite similarly to the subsequent 1938 invasion of the Sudetenland, Putin is increasing his military support for the separatists...

Greece: It is clear by now that Germany has coerced the new Greek government into submission over the last 2-3 weeks, only waiting the list of additional taxes baptized reforms to complete this. It is one more victory for Germany over the "spendthrift and lazy Greeks". What did Germany do wrong here:
  1. It has shown once again that it considers itself as the undisputed rightful boss of the eurozone, taking over the negotiation with Greece as if it was only Germany who provided loans.
  2. It has won once again brownie points by telling Greece to repay all its debts. Yet this is an impossibility, once again postponing the inevitable and continuing failed austerity with a new name.
  3. The inevitable default will only lead to the complete destabilization of Greece, adding to the world's problems, without getting any loans repaid anyway. Greece was economically and socially destabilized already, the basis of Syriza's victory, it can now go on collapsing. Capital flight will only continue and no sensible investor will put his money into increased uncertainty.
  4. It has shown to all euroskeptics that their nationalistic arguments against the euro and the EU are 100% valid. As Podemos leader said, if Germany does not relax austerity for Greece, they should expect to be talking to Marine Lepen's Front National in the near future. It also proves to the UK that not joining the euro was the wisest thing ever done, thus retaining sovereignty.
  5. It has worked up on nationalist lines its own population, undermining even more the European Project. Tabloid titles remind of other sadder times.
  6. It has proven to Poland that being in the EU/NATO protects from Russia, not being in the euro protects from Germany.
This sounds pretty pyrrhic .. no debt repayment, no or less euro, no european integration, more nationalistic Germans.


PS 1: A recent example of the discussion on Germany's self assumed Euro-boss role.

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-22/germany-thinks-it-s-europe-s-boss-on-greek-debt

PS 2: Brief background on Ukraine crisis: The West and Germany in particular, has tried to get the Ukraine to become part of the EU and had spent years pushing for entry negotiations/other preentry status . The change of the elected president's stance on the EU resulted in a "popular" revolution to topple him, with the full blown support of the west. This is fundamentally a sort of a coup d'etat, as it was focused on the nationalistic Ukrainian Kiev area and ignored the majority russian rest of the country. As Russia views the Ukraine as part of Russia and not merely a satellite state under the Yalta Treaty, it is inconceivable to them to let go of the Ukraine, and even more the majority russian areas. So they immediately reacted with annexing Crimea, an area where very few ethnic ukrainians had ever existed and was only a historical administrative transfer from SSRussia to SSUkraine; and since then, they have been supporting the separatist Russians in the east part of today's Ukraine.

Sunday, February 22, 2015